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Abstract The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our
most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any
of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the
doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic
cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view
of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary quality
arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their
environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered
system of events.
Keywords Ontology · spacetime · general relativity · quantum mechanics
Again, the ‘now’ which seems to bound the past and the future –
does it always remain one and the same or is it always other and
other? It is hard to say.
Aristotle.
1 Introduction
Time has always puzzled philosophers and scientists alike. Traditionally, there
are two broad views about the nature of time. These views are usually called
the “tensed” and the “tenseless” views, or, for simplicity, the A and B the-
ories of time. For an A-oriented person, only present things exist. There are
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many varieties of this ontological position: presentism, becoming theory, prim-
itive tenses, branching universe theory, and so on. All of them distinguish the
present in some way. In particular, presentism is the doctrine that it is always
the case that, for every x, x is present. The logical quantification in this defini-
tion is unrestricted, it ranges over all existents. In order to make this definition
meaningful, the presentist must provide a specification of the term “present”.
A standard definition is:
Present: The mereological sum of all objects with null temporal distance
(Crisp 2003).
Since the mereological sum of objects is always an object, we can infer that
for a presentist the present is an object, i.e. an individual with some properties.
The open formula ‘x is present’ in the definition above, then means ‘x is part
of the mereological sum of all objects with null temporal distance’. It also
purports that what there is exists only at an instant, not over a span of time.
A B-oriented person considers all this as pure nonsense. She maintains that
past, present and future ‘equally’ exist. For her, the fundamental temporal
properties are relations of ‘earlier than’, ‘later than’ and ‘simultaneous with’.
These are relations between events. There is no present in any absolute sense.
The present is not an object. Then, it cannot move, since only objects can
move with respect to each other. There is no objective ‘flow’ or passage of
time.
What is, then, the present in this view? My aim, in this article, is to answer
this question from a B-perspective.
2 Against Presentism
The Englishman John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart presented a disproof of pre-
sentism in his famous paper Unreality of Time (McTaggart 1908). He reasoned
as follows.
1. There is no time without change.
2. If time passes, events should change with respect to the properties of past-
ness, presentness, and futureness.
3. A given event, then, should be able to be in absolute sense, past, present
and future.
4. These properties exclude each other.
Then: Events do not pass, just are.
There is no passage of time. There is no moving present. The mere idea
of a flowing time simply does not make any sense. An additional problem is
that if time flows, it should move with respect to something. If we say that
there is a super-time with respect to which time flows, then we shall need a
super-super-time for this super-time, and we shall have an infinite regress. In
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addition, there is no flow without a rate of flow. At what rate does time go by?
The answer 1 sec per sec is meaningless. It is like saying that a road extends
along a distance of one km per each km that it extends!
On the physical side, the theory of special relativity seems not to be
friendly to the idea of an absolute present, at least in its usual Minkowskian
4-dimensional interpretation. Special relativity is the theory of moving bod-
ies formulated by Albert Einstein in 1905 (Einstein 1905). It postulates the
Lorentz-invariance of all physical law statements that hold in a special type
of reference systems, called inertial frames. Hence the ‘restricted’ or ‘special’
character of the theory. The equations of Maxwell electrodynamics are Lorentz-
invariant, but those of classical mechanics are not. When classical mechanics
is revised to accommodate invariance under Lorentz transformations between
inertial reference frames, several modifications appear. The most notorious is
the impossibility of defining an absolute simultaneity relation between events.
Simultaneity results to be frame-dependent. Then, some events can be future
events in some reference system, and present or past in another system. Since
what exists cannot depend on the reference frame adopted for the description
of nature, it is concluded that past, present, and future events exist. Conse-
quently, presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is false.
The presentist or A-theorist of time might find a way around this argument
adopting a different (purely Lorentzian) interpretation of the theory (Crisp
2008, Zimmerman 2011), which relinquishes the concept of space-time. The
problems of this approach have been discussed at length by Saunders (2002),
and I do not insist on the topic here. Instead, I prefer to say a few words about
the much less discussed issue of the compatibility of presentism with general
relativity.
General relativity is the theory of space, time and gravitation proposed
by Einstein in 1915 (Einstein 1915). Space-time is an indispensable ingredient
of this theory. A 4-dimensional real and differentiable manifold is adopted to
represent space-time, the physical aggregation of all events (Romero 2013). A
rank-2 metric field gab is defined over the manifold to represent the potentials
of the gravitational field. Distances over the manifold are given by
ds2 = gabdx
adxb, (1)
where dxa is a 4-dimensional differential length vector. The key issue to de-
termine the geometric structure of space-time, and hence to specify the effects
of gravity, is to find the law that fixes the metric once the source of the grav-
itational field is given. The source of the gravitational field is matter. The
energy-momentum tensor Tab represents the physical properties of material
things that generate space-time. The curvature of space-time at any event is
related to the energy-momentum content at that event by a set of differential
equations.
These equations, the Einstein field equations, can be written in the simple
form:
Gab = −
8piG
c4
Tab, (2)
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Fig. 1 A ‘presentist-friendly’ space-time: Evolving 3-dimensional space-like surfaces in a
space-time with a preferred time-direction.
where Gab is the so-called Einstein’s tensor, which is linear in the curvature
1
and non-linear in the metric. It contains all the geometric information on space-
time. The constants G and c are the gravitational constant and the speed of
light in vacuum. Einstein’s field equations are a set of ten non-linear partial
differential equations for the metric coefficients.
A crucial point of general relativity is that the 4-dimensional space-time
with non-zero curvature is not dispensable anymore. Contrarily to the Minkowskian
case, general relativity is not susceptible of a global Lorentzian formulation.
This poses a problem for presentism, because of the relativity of simultaneity
implied by the constancy of the speed of light in space-time. However, for some
cosmological models Mst =< M, gab, Tab > a kind of ‘cosmic time’ can be
re-introduced in space-time, and some presentists have tried to use it to their
advantage.
Thomas Crisp (2008) has proposed a “presentist-friendly” model of general
relativity. He suggests that the world is represented by a 3-dimensional space-
like hypersurface that evolves in a forth dimension (time). This interpretation
requires the introduction of a preferred foliation of space-time at large scales,
and to consider the 3+ 1 usual decomposition for the dynamics of space-time
in such a way that ‘the present’ is identified with the evolving hypersurface.
This situation is depicted in Figure 1.
In order to set up such a model for space-time, some global constraints
must be imposed: there should be a unique foliation into surfaces of constant
mean curvature. This is the case, for instance, of the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker-Lemaˆıtre metric. This metric is isotropic and homogeneous. General
conditions for such kind of metrics require the absence of Cauchy horizons,
the fulfillment of the so-called energy conditions (Hawking and Ellis 1973),
and symmetry constraints. In this kind of metrics, the parameter along which
the hypersurfaces evolve is called ‘cosmic time’.
1 The curvature is represented by the Riemann tensor Rabcd, formed with second deriva-
tives of the metric (see, e.g. Hawking and Ellis 1973).
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I confess that I do not see how such ‘cosmic time’ can help the presentist’s
cause. The foliation of a manifold is nothing else than a computational device.
The selection of a given hypersuface as ‘present’ is completely arbitrary. A
hypersurface is nothing else than a class of events (i.e. a concept, not a thing),
which we decide to specify as initial data for subsequent calculations. Any
hypersurface can be used for this purpose, and since the Einstein equations
are time-reversible, we can compute the evolution with respect to both t and
−t. There is not reason for thinking that a particular class of events, even if
they are all space-like, is the ‘present’. Moreover, classes do not flow, as the
present is supposed to do.
A similar criticism is valid for the definition of present given by Crisp
(2003), who considers that the present is the aggregation of all things (I would
say events) with null temporal distance. There are events with null temporal
distance in the past of the event of reading this line, which are simultane-
ous with the landing of Apollo 11 on the moon on July 20th 1969. There is
no reason to think that your reading of this line is ‘now’ and not the events
simultaneous with Armstrong’s remarkable step: both events form part of ag-
gregates with null temporal distances. Why one aggregate of events is present
and the other is not?
There are additional problems related to the actual structure of the uni-
verse if it is supposed to be represented by a smoothly foliable theoretical
space-time model Mst. First, there are black holes. Non-spherically symmet-
ric black holes (i.e. rotating or Kerr black holes) have Cauchy horizons. There
is no way to compute the evolution of any physical system inside these re-
gions, whatever be the external space-time foliation. There is no possibility
of synchronization between clocks outside and inside the inner horizon of a
Kerr black hole. And the evidence for rotating black holes in the universe is
overwhelming (e.g. Romero and Vila 2013). This point cannot be ignored by
the presentist.
Another problem for the ‘presentist-friendly’ space-time is that observa-
tional data indicate that remote supernovae Type Ia present redshifts that
either suggest the universe is expanding in an accelerated way or it is inho-
mogeneous. Both possibilities are ruinous for the presentist. The first requires
massive violations of the energy conditions in the universe. These violations
can be produced by dark fields with negative energy densities or by gravity
with modified dynamical equations. In either case, particle cosmological hori-
zons appear in the universe, disconnecting different regions and making global
time synchronization impossible. On the other hand, if the universe is inho-
mogeneous or anisotropic on medium scales, then the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker-Lemaˆıtre model is not a correct description of space-time and more
complex models should be considered. No foliation of constant curvature is
possible with inhomogeneity or anisotropy, with the consequent problem for
synchronization.
Zimmerman (2011) has pointed out that in a desperate case of conflict with
general relativity the presentist can abandon Einstein’s theory, since one can
be sure that relativity is ultimately a wrong theory because it is incompati-
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ble with quantum mechanics. I protest. General relativity is not inconsistent
with quantum mechanics as it is sometimes loosely stated. The background
space-time of quantum mechanics is flat Minkowskian space-time. Even in a
space-time with non-zero curvature, quantum mechanical calculations can be
performed (Wald 1994). General relativity is a classical theory, and hence it
cannot deal with quantum interactions of the gravitational field. This is some-
thing very different from saying the there is incompatibility with quantum
mechanics or quantum field theory. What is not known is what a quantum
field theory of gravitation is. What we actually know is that at the scales that
are relevant for the presentist, general relativity is a well-tested theory. But
even if it is replaced by other field theory to better accommodate the phe-
nomenology of dark matter and the apparent universal accelerated expansion,
the very same problems I mentioned above will remain. For the presentist, the
battle is lost from the beginning: the very concept of space-time is at odds with
presentism. And this is because space-time is the ontological sum of all events.
The mere postulation of space-time implies a consent to events that can be
classified as past or future with respect to some other events. Space-time is
inconsistent with presentism.
Said all that, yet, we all have a kind of feeling that “our time is running
out”. Where does this feeling come from? To answer we should look not at
space-time, but into our own brains.
3 When is ‘now’?
If the present is an instant of time instead of a thing, then the question of
“which instant is present?” follows. One possible answer is “now”. But...when
is ‘now’?
‘Now’, like ‘here’, is an indexical word. To say that I exist now gives no
information on when I exist. Similarly, to say that I am here, gives no infor-
mation on where I am. There is no particular moment of time defined as an
absolute now.
I maintain that ‘nowness’ and ‘hereness’ emerge from the existence of per-
ceiving self-conscious beings in a certain environment. What these beings per-
ceive is not time, but changes in things, i.e. events (Bunge 1977). Similarly,
they do not perceive space, but spatial relations among things. In particular,
we do not perceive the passage of time. We perceive how our brain changes. I
claim that there is no present per se, in the same way that there is no smell, no
pain, no joy, no beauty, no noise, no secondary qualities at all without sentient
beings. What we call “the present” is not in the world. It emerges from our
interaction with the world.
We group various experienced inputs together as present; we are tempted
to think that this grouping is done by the world, not by us. But this is just
delusional. I maintain that tenses are not needed and in fact are not wanted
by the natural sciences. This idea is clearly expressed by E. Poeppel on the
basis of neurological research (Poeppel 1978):
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[...] our brain furnishes an integrative mechanism that shapes se-
quences of events to unitary forms...that which is integrated is the
unique content of consciousness which seems to us present. The in-
tegration, which itself objectively extends over time, is thus the basis
of our experiencing a thing as present.
[...] The now, the subjective present, is nothing independently; rather
it is an attribute of the content of consciousness. Every object of con-
sciousness is necessarily always now - hence the feeling of nowness.
The perception of motion gives an additional argument against the idea
that the present is an instant of time. According to Le Poidevin (2009):
1. What we perceive, we perceive as present.
2. We perceive motion.
3. Motion occurs over an interval.
Therefore: What we perceive as present occurs over an interval.
Recent research in neurosciences lends strong support to these claims.
Perception of events outside the brain and the construction of what we call
time is a complex cluster of processes that involves different cortical and sub-
cortical regions. Distortions in timing can be produced by narcotics, experi-
mental manipulation, strong emotions, and by different brain disorders such
as Alzheimer’s disease, clearly indicating a dependence of temporal experience
on brain processes. The involvement of sub-cortical areas in external change
perception explains why extreme fear and other abnormal emotional states
can modify the subjective experience of time (e.g. Stetson et al. 2007).
A very important breakthrough in neurological research about the timing
mechanisms operating in the brain was made by Benjamin Libet and collabo-
rators (Libet et al. 1964, Libet 1973). In a series of now classical experiments,
Libet et al. demonstrated that there is a time delay of about 0.5 s between the
starting of brain stimulation and the appearance of awareness of the stimulus.
This shows that awareness of an event happens in the brain when the event
is past: what we become aware of has already occurred about 0.5 s earlier.
In Libet’s words: “We are not conscious of the actual moment of the present.
We are always a little late.” (Libet 2004). The entire battery of sensory stim-
uli are manipulated by the brain to create a coherent representation of the
external world in such a way that we are not aware of any time delay. The
subjective ‘present’ is actually a construction made with a manifold of sensory
information of events in the past.
The motor system does not wait ∼ 0.5 s before making its decisions. These
are done unconsciously and over spans as short as 10 ms in some cases. Con-
sciousness allows further interpretation and adjustments on the basis of later
information (Eagleman et al. 2000). The actual span required to create a tran-
sient representation of the environment can vary from an individual to another,
but should take more than 100 ms on average. In Eagelman’s words (Eagleman
2009):
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This hypothesis –that the system waits to collect information over
the window of time during which it streams in– applies not only to vision
but more generally to all the other senses. Whereas we have measured
a tenth-of-a-second window of postdiction in vision, the breadth of this
window may be different for hearing or touch. If I touch your toe and
your nose at the same time, you will feel those touches as simultaneous.
This is surprising, because the signal from your nose reaches your brain
well before the signal from your toe. Why didn’t you feel the nose-
touch when it first arrived? Did your brain wait to see what else might
be coming up in the pipeline of the spinal cord until it was sure it had
waited long enough for the slower signal from the toe? Strange as that
sounds, it may be correct.
It may be that a unified polysensory perception of the world has
to wait for the slowest overall information. Given conduction times
along limbs, this leads to the bizarre but testable suggestion that tall
people may live further in the past than short people. The consequence
of waiting for temporally spread signals is that perception becomes
something like the airing of a live television show. Such shows are not
truly live but are delayed by a small window of time, in case editing
becomes necessary.
All evidence from neuroscience research points to the hypothesis the ‘the
present’ is a construction of the brain; a construction that is not instantaneous.
We do not perceive time; we only are aware of events and can compare the
event rate or their clustering in the external world with the rate of activity of
our own brain (e.g. Karmarkar and Buonano 2007).
Any tentative definition of ‘present’ compatible with modern neuro-biology
science must take into account the role of the perceiving and sentient individ-
ual. In the next section I offer some provisional definitions that meet this
requirement and distinguish among the different meanings in which the word
‘present’ is used.
4 Defining the present
Physical events are ordered by the relations ‘earlier than’ or ‘later than’, and
‘simultaneous with’ (Gru¨nbaum 1973). There is no ‘now’ or ‘present’ in the
mathematical representation of the physical laws. What we call ‘present’ is not
an intrinsic property of the events nor an instant of time, much less a moving
thing. ‘Present’ is a concept abstracted from the relation between a certain
number of events and a self-conscious individual.
Present: Class of all events simultaneous with a given brain state.
To every brain state there is a corresponding present. The individual,
notwithstanding, needs not to be aware of all events that form the present. The
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present, being a class of events, is an abstract object without any causal power.
Psychological present: Class of local events that are causally2 connected
to a given brain state.
Notice that from a biological point of view only local events are relevant.
These events are those that directly trigger neuro-chemical reactions in the
brain. Such events are located in the immediate causal past of the brain events
that define the corresponding state. The psychological present is a conceptual
construction of the brain, based on abstraction from events belonging to an
equivalence class. The present, then again, is not a thing nor a change in a
thing (an event). It is a construction of the brain; a fiction albeit a very useful
one for survival. Yet again, individuals are not necessarily aware of all events
that are causally relevant for the construction of the psychological present.
E.R. Kelly (1882) introduced the concept of ‘specious present’, whichWilliam
James elaborated as “the short duration of which we are immediately and in-
cessantly sensible” (James 1908). I propose to update this definition to:
Specious present: Length of the time-history of brain processes necessary
to integrate all local events that are physically (causally) related to a given
brain state.
The specious present, being related to brain processes, can be different
for different individuals equipped with different brains. The integration of the
specious present can be performed in different ways, depending on the struc-
ture of the brain. It is even possible to imagine integration systems that can
produce more than one specious present or even systems that might ‘recall’
the future (see Hartle 2005 for examples based on computers). If biological
evolution has not produced such systems, it seems because of the existence of
space-time asymmetric boundary conditions that introduce a preferred direc-
tion for the occurrence of processes (Romero and Pe´rez 2011).
Finally, I introduce a physical present.
Physical present: Class of events that belong to a space-like hypersurface
in a smooth and continuous foliation of a time-orientable space-time.
Since in the manifold model of space-time every event is represented by
an element of the manifold, the introduction of this class does not signal a
special time identified with ‘now’. Every space-like hypersurface corresponds
to a different time and none of them is an absolute present ‘moving’ into
the future. Actually, naming ‘the future’ to a set of surfaces in the direction
opposite to the so-called Bing Bang is purely conventional.
2 For a complete account of causality as a relation between events see Bunge (1979).
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5 Final remarks
I have distinguished three different types of present: psychological, physical,
and specious. The former two are classes of events, hence they are concepts.
The latter is not an instant of time but an interval in space-time associated
with the world history of a sentient individual.
In any case, the present does not flow or move. Only material individuals
(and their brains, if they have one) can change and move. Becoming is not
a property of physical events, but of the consciousness of the events. We call
‘becoming’ to the series of states of consciousness associated with a certain
string of physical changes. Events do not become. Events just are.
Appendix: Present time in quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics has been invoked to justify almost every conceivable be-
lief, from free will to the existence of God. It is not surprising that the pre-
sentists have also appealed to it. Two main arguments have been proposed
to support presentism: the so-called ‘collapse of the wave function’, and the
non-locality implied by the experimental violation of Bell’s inequalities. In this
appendix I discuss and dismiss both arguments.
The collapse of the wave function is supposed to involve absolute simultane-
ity. Absolute simultaneity, in turn, allows to classify events into past, present
and future a´ la Newton. The argument runs as follows, in words of Michael
Tooley (Tooley 2008):
Consider an electron that has been fired towards the screen of a
cathode ray tube. According to quantum mechanics, the initial condi-
tions do not causally determine what point on the screen the electron
will strike. All that follows from the laws of quantum mechanics is that
there are various non-zero probabilities of the electron’s striking differ-
ent parts of the screen. But once the electron strikes the screen, the
probabilities of hitting other parts of the screen must change from hav-
ing non-zero values to being equal to zero. But then must it not be
the case that that all these changes are absolutely simultaneous with
the event that consists of the electron’s hitting the screen a certain
location?3
This is abhorrent. It is claimed that probabilities, a mathematical construct
that represents a certain propensity of a physical system, can change in space
and time. This reification of the concept of probability is wrong independently
of quantum mechanics. Think, for instance, of a roulette. A croupier spins
a wheel in one direction, then spins a ball in the opposite direction around
the tilted circular track running around the circumference of the wheel. The
ball eventually loses momentum and falls onto the wheel and into one of 37 (in
3 My italics.
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French/European roulette) or 38 (in American roulette) colored and numbered
pockets on the wheel. Let us consider a French roulette. There is an a priori
probability of 1/37 for a given number to be the winner. After the ball has
fallen into a given pocket, say number 7, the probability for this number is
still 1/37, no 1! Because of this low probability is that the casino is paying
you. Similarly, if you toss a coin, there is a probability of 1/2 of getting heads
both before and after a flipping. Probabilities are not a physical field that
suddenly collapses at some moment of time. As all mathematical constructs,
probabilities are timeless.
Even the so-called ‘collapse of the wave function’ is non-sense since the
wave function is a mathematical function defined in a Hilbert space, not an
entity propagating through space-time, and hence it cannot collapse at all. The
wave function allows to estimate probabilities of a given event. It is a solution
of the Schro¨dinger or Dirac equations, which are linear differential equations.
The physics of the non-linear interaction of the quantum system represented
by the wave function and the environment is surely non-linear and must be
discussed in the context of a theory of quantum measurement, that depends on
the details of the detector. Certainly, it is not enough just to add a postulate
(as von Neumann’s) to account for such a complex theory (see Bunge 1967,
Perez-Bergliaffa et al. 1993).
Let us turn to the claim that quantum non-locality reestablishes abso-
lute simultaneity and introduces a preferred foliation of space-time. Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen (1935) -EPR- were the first to notice that quantum me-
chanics might imply non-locality. Consider two electrons prepared in a singlet
state and fired in opposite directions from a central source with equal veloci-
ties. This event occurs at a time t0. Quantum mechanics describes the system
with a single two-particle wave function that is not the product of indepen-
dent particle wave functions. Because electrons are indistinguishable particles,
it is not proper to say that electron 1 goes this way and electron 2 that way.
At a later time t1 > t0, a measurement of one electron’s momentum
4 would
instantly reveal the momentum of the other electron - without need of mea-
suring it. This is a non-local correlation that seems to violate relativity if the
separation of the electrons is space-like. Schro¨dinger described the two elec-
trons as “entangled” (verschra¨nkt) at their first measurement, so the EPR
“non-locality” phenomenon is also known as “quantum entanglement”.
Contrary to Einstein’s expectations, experiments have generally favored
quantum mechanics as a description of nature, over local hidden variable the-
ories. Any physical theory that supersedes or replaces quantum theory must
make similar experimental predictions and must therefore also be non-local
in the specific sense of showing the existence of space-like correlations for en-
tangled quantum systems. Does this imply the existence of the present? I say
no.
4 Although I am considering the momentum, a conserved quantity, in this example, con-
servation laws do not seem to play a role in the phenomenon, since these kind of correlations
are observed in the polarization of photons, which certainly in not a conserved quantity (see
Maudlin 2002).
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The existence of correlations between components of entangled systems
does not require superluminal matter transport or signaling. Much less of
information. Information is a property of languages, not of physical systems.
Contrary to what Tim Maudlin (2002) states, superluminal transmission of
information is not required by quantum entanglement. Information has not,
and cannot, have any effect upon physical systems.
The correlations just show that once a system is formed, it remains a sys-
tem. Although the actual mechanism that enforces the systemic memory is not
clear, quantum non-locality cannot be used to define an absolute simultane-
ity, since far from be universal, its very nature requires it to be selective and
operating only on systems that were prepared in a singlet state once. There
is no way to know the output of a measurement on the second electron of our
example above if the data on the preparation and the first measurement were
not transmitted to the second detector. This transmission is only possible at
the speed of light, at most.
I conclude that the concept of present is alien to quantum mechanics.
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